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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's March 1996 decision in Barnett Bank of
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,' affirming the authority of national
banks to sell insurance, notwithstanding a restrictive state insurance
law, should significantly increase bank participation in the delivery
and distribution of insurance products.2 As a result, identifying the
role of state regulation of these activities is an increasingly important
issue for national banks-and for state insurance regulators.
The interplay of state regulation and federally authorized na-
tional bank powers is not a new issue. The establishment of the
national banking system in 1863 created a federal component to a
commercial banking system then comprised of state chartered banks.3
Under this system, national banks are subject to comprehensive fed-
eral regulation affecting their organization, operation, examination
and supervision.4 It has been said that the National Bank Act consti-
tutes a complete system for the establishment and government of
national banks.'
' Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; B.A., 1971, Goddard
College; J.D., 1975, Antioch School of Law. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the OCC.
" Stuart Feldstein is an Assistant Director in the Legislative and Regulatory Activi-
ties Division of the OCC's Law Department.
"' Karen McSweeney is an attorney in the Legislative and Regulatory Activities
Division of the OCC's Law Department.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996).
2. The immediate effect of Barnett is to make inapplicable to national banks provi-
sions of several state anti-affiliation laws that prevented national banks from selling
insurance in those states. See Howard Kapiloff, Bank Insurance Sales Likely to Take Off,
Analysts Say, AM. BANKER, Apr. 16, 1996, at 8.
3. See generally EDWARD SYMONS, JR. & JAMES WHITE, BANKING LAW, 1-46 (3d
ed. 1991).
4. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216d (1994).
5. See Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
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However, courts have also recognized that many aspects of a na-
tional bank's operations are subject to state laws.6 This dual structure
can create a tension between state regulation intended to address le-
gitimate state concerns and state provisions that prevent federally-
created entities-national banks-from exercising the powers vested
in them under federal law. Federal preemption of state law is a
mechanism that preserves the independence and authority of the fed-
eral banking system by limiting the level of state control of the
powers and activities of the members of that system.
For years national banks have sold insurance and annuity prod-
ucts without notable adverse experience. However, recent litigation
tests the limits of state regulation of these activities. 7 The Barnett de-
cision is a pivotal pronouncement in this area and provides valuable
guidance on the application of state regulation to federally-
authorized national bank powers. This Article provides a general
overview of national bank insurance and annuities activities and dis-
cusses what Barnett may mean for national banks conducting
insurance activities, including the role of the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (the OCC), in light of that decision.
II. OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL BANK INSURANCE AND ANNUITY
ACTIVITIES
National banks currently engage in a wide range of insurance
and annuity activities pursuant to authority contained in Sections 92
and 24 of title 12 of the United States Code. A brief survey of these
activities provides a useful context for considering how they may be
affected by state law.
A. National Bank Insurance Activities Under Section 92
Section 92 of title 12 of the United States Code authorizes na-
tional banks to sell insurance as agents from small communities.
Specifically, § 92 provides, in pertinent part, that:
In addition to the powers now vested by law in national
6. See National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 361-62 (1870)
(holding that national banks are "subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in
their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation").
7. See, e.g., Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1350 (1996); NBD Bank v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995); Shaw-
mut Bank Conn., N.A. v. Googins, No. 3:94CV46 (JBA) (D. Conn. July 29, 1996); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Ruthardt, 96-12075 PBS (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 1996); Deposit Guar.
Nat'l Bank v. Dale, No. 3:95CV640WN (S.D. Miss. filed Aug. 21, 1995); Texas Bankers
Ass'n. v. Bomer, A-96CA-694-JN (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 9, 1996).
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banking associations organized under the laws of the United
States any such association located and doing business in
any place the population of which does not exceed five
thousand inhabitants ... may, under such rules and regula-
tions as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the
Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insur-
ance company authorized by the authorities of the State in
which said bank is located to do business in said State, by
soliciting and selling insurance and collecting premiums on
policies issued by such company; and may receive for serv-
ices so rendered such fees or commissions as may be agreed
upon between the said association and the insurance com-
pany for which it may act as agent ....8
The OCC and the courts have construed this authority broadly
to permit national banks with their main office or a branch located in
a "place" of less than 5,000 in population to conduct a full range of
insurance agency activities from an agency located in that "place.
9
OCC actions and judicial decisions have also addressed the geo-
graphic scope of a national bank's insurance activities under § 92.
For example, an OCC interpretive ruling dating from 1963 provides
that a national bank may act as a general insurance agent under § 92
from any office located in a community of less than 5,000, even if the
national bank's principal office is located in a town with a population
that exceeds 5,000 inhabitants.'0 In addition, in Independent Insur-
ance Agents of America v. Ludwig, the D.C. Circuit upheld an OCC
opinion that § 92 does not impose any geographic limitation on the
scope of the insurance business." In Ludwig, the court affirmed the
8. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994).
9. See, e.g., Letter from H. Joe Selby, First Deputy Comptroller for Operations
(June 30, 1976) (unpublished) (stating that a § 92 insurance agency "may sell all types of
insurance to bank customers and non-customers alike."); American Land Title Ass'n v.
Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 156 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993) ("Section 92
applies to national banks that 'act as agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company.'
We believe that this language makes inescapable the conclusion that Congress intended
this provision to apply to 'any... insurance company .....'" (citation omitted)).
10. 61 Fed. Reg. 4849 (1996) (renumbered and to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.1001.)
This ruling has been upheld by one court as valid due to laches. National Association of
Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir.
1992), reh'g en banc denied, 965 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
United States National Bank v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2173 (1993), affd on remand, Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Lud-
wig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
11. 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also NBD Bank v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th
Cir. 1995).
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OCC determination that a "bank is free to solicit and serve insurance
customers everywhere" 2 concluding that § 92 "evinces no unambigu-
ous command that the bank may sell insurance only to local
townspeople."13
In Interpretive Letter No. 753, the OCC further interpreted the
extent to which § 92 allows insurance marketing and sales activities to
be conducted outside the "place" of 5,000.'4 The Interpretive Letter
articulated two broad principles. First, the agency located in the
place of 5,000 must be bona fide. The facts addressed by the letter
included the following: agents would be licensed and managed
through the agency that was located in the place of 5,000; the agency
would be responsible for collecting commissions from insurance car-
riers and paying commissions to its licensed sales staff; the agency
would generally be responsible for processing insurance applications
and delivery of policies where this is consistent with the procedures
of the relevant insurance carriers; and business records of the agency
would be available at the place of 5,000.
Second, the Letter concluded that the bank agency and its agents
may seek the same market range and use the same marketing tools
and facilities as generally available for a licensed insurance agency,
not affiliated with a bank, that was based in the place of 5,000. This
second principle would generally allow the following: (1) meetings
with customers and solicitations and sales of insurance by the bank's
agents at locations both inside and outside the place of 5,000; (2)
mailings to advertise and sell insurance that originate from inside or
outside of the place of 5,000 and brochures and other advertising ma-
terials that are distributed from locations inside and outside of the
place of 5,000, including other offices of the bank; (3) referrals by
personnel at bank offices inside and outside of the place of 5,000 to
the bank's insurance agency; (4) use of the telephone and cybermar-
keting with the calls and messages originating either within or outside
the place of 5,000; and (5) contracting with third parties to assist the
agency's sales activities including advertising support, direct mail
marketing services, telemarketing services, payments processing, and
12. Ludwig, 997 F.2d at 958.
13. Id. at 960. In NBD, the court also made clear that § 92 delegates regulatory
authority to the OCC. In that regard, the Court noted that "[t]he Comptroller believes
not only that § 92 permits small-town branches to sell insurance but also that these sales
are desirable: they enhance banks' revenues, diversify their business without creating any
threat to insolvency, and increase competition. Banks, buyers of insurance, and the fed-
eral deposit insurance fund all gain." NBD, 67 F.3d at 632.
14. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 753 (Nov. 4, 1996) reprinted in [Current Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-107.
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other types of "back office" support.
B. National Bank Insurance and Annuity Activities Under Section 24
(Seventh)
National banks also are authorized to engage in the "business of
banking," and may exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking."15 As described below,
the OCC has approved certain insurance and annuity activities under
this authority. 6
1. Credit Life Insurance
The OCC has long recognized the ability of a national bank to
act as agent in the sale of credit life insurance. 7 The OCC found the
sale of this type of insurance to be incidental to a national bank's ex-
press lending authority because it protects a bank's interest in a loan
in the event of the death or disability of the borrower. Courts have
15. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
16. Various OCC decisions regarding national bank insurance powers under
§ 24(Seventh) have been the subject of litigation. In Saxon v. Georgia Association of
Independent Insurance Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1968), the court found that
because the Congress specifically dealt with insurance agency power in § 92, the expressio
unius est exclusio alterius rule of statutory construction "negates the existence of any
other power to act as insurance agent under the general provisions of Section 24(7)." The
Second Circuit has aligned itself with the reasoning in Saxon in finding that § 92 impliedly
bars a national bank in a town of more than 5,000 from selling title insurance as agent.
See American Land Title Association v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993). However, there are strong arguments that Saxon was wrongly
decided. See Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 736 F.2d 468, 477 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984); Independent Bankers
Association of America v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
823 (1980).
17. 12 C.F.R. Part 2 (42 Fed. Reg. 48518 (1977)); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 283
(Mar. 16, 1984) reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1
85,547. The OCC has also approved the direct underwriting and reinsurance of credit life
insurance as incidental to the business of banking in that it is convenient and useful to
performing the bank's express power to lend money and is a "logical component to a na-
tional bank's power to sell credit life." OCC Interpretive Letter No. 277 (Dec. 21, 1983)
reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,441.
18. The OCC has defined the term "credit life insurance" to mean "credit life, health
and accident insurance, sometimes referred to as credit life and disability insurance." See
61 Fed. Reg. 51781 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 2.2(b)). Part 2 also places limits
on the distribution of credit life insurance income by prohibiting bank officers, directors,
employees, or principal shareholders, and entities in which these persons own an interest
of more than ten percent, from retaining commissions or income from sales of credit life
insurance in connection with a loan made by the bank. This income must be credited to
the bank, although limited exceptions are provided for bonus and incentive plans and dual
employees. See 61 Fed. Reg. 51781 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 2.3,2.4).
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upheld the sale of credit life insurance as within the bank's incidental
powers."
a. Other Credit Insurance To Reduce Risk of Loss to the Bank
The OCC has also approved the salem of other types of credit
related insurance under the bank's incidental powers where the sale
of the insurance is intended to reduce the risk of loss to the bank.
For example, the OCC approved the sale of involuntary unemploy-
ment insurance2' (intended to protect the bank if the borrower
becomes involuntarily unemployed), vendors single interest insur-
ance' and double interest insurance' (special types of credit related
insurance insuring the bank or the bank and the borrower, respec-
tively, against loss or damage to personal property in which the bank
has a security interest as a result of a loan), and mechanical break-
down insurance 4 (protecting an installment loan customer against
most major mechanical failures during the life of the loan). The
OCC found each of these types of insurance incidental to a national
bank's express lending authority.
More recently, the OCC approved the sale of vehicle service
contracts intended to protect the value of the collateral from me-
chanical breakdown.' The OCC reviewed its prior opinions in this
area and concluded that where "a contract protects the value of col-
lateral securing financing extended by the bank and aids in the
collection of a particular type of financing extended by the bank, the
bank's sale of such contract may properly be viewed as part of or in-
cidental to the business of banking within the meaning of § 24
(Seventh). 26
b. Title Insurance
Title insurance protects banks and customers against unknown
encumbrances on the property. The OCC analyzed the linkage be-
19. See IBAA v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 823
(1980).
20. The term "sale" is used to describe sales as agent rather than underwriting.
21. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 283, supra note 17, at 85,547.
22. See Id.
23. See Letter from William Glidden, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory Services
Division (June 3, 1986) (unpublished) (on file with author).
24. See Letter from William Glidden, Assistant Director, Bank Operations and As-
sets Division (June 17, 1993) (unpublished) (on file with author).
25. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 671 (July 10, 1995) reprinted in [1994-1995




tween this purpose and national banks' lending authority and ap-
proved the sale of title insurance by a national bank as incidental to
the express authority of a national bank to make loans secured by
real property.' Nevertheless, the Second Circuit reversed the OCC
determination and held that § 92 prohibits national banks located in
and doing business in towns with more than 5,000 in population from
selling title insurance as agent.'
c. Municipal Bond Insurance
The OCC has approved the sale of municipal bond insurance
under § 24(Seventh) as functionally equivalent to the traditional
banking activity of issuing standby letters of credit.29 The D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld the OCC determination.'
d. Fixed and Variable Rate Annuities
In NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company
(VALIC),31 the Supreme Court confirmed the power of a national
bank to sell fixed and variable rate annuities as financial investment
instruments under the authority of § 24(Seventh). The Court found
that the OCC had appropriately examined the characteristics of an-
nuities, including the fact that annuities serve a comparable
investment purpose and are functionally similar to other bank in-
vestment products in meeting the needs of bank customers, and that
the OCC had reasonably concluded that annuities are properly classi-
fied as investments and not insurance. The VALIC decision also has
significance beyond its specific conclusions and provides the founda-
tion for maintaining a modem framework for defining the business of
banking. 2 This framework could accommodate various insurance
related activities.
27. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 368 (July 11, 1986) reprinted in [1985-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,538. The OCC has also approved
underwriting of title insurance. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 377 (Feb. 6, 1987) reprinted
in [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,601.
28. See American Land Title Association v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert.
denied 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993).
29. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 338 (May 2, 1985) reprinted in [1985-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,508.
30. See American Insurance Association v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
31. 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
32. See Williams and Jacobsen, The Business of Banking: Looking to the Future, 50
Bus. LAW. 783 (May 1995).
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e. Mortgage Reinsurance
In Interpretive Letter No. 743, the OCC concluded that it was
permissible under the National Bank Act for a national bank to es-
tablish an operating subsidiary to reinsure a portion of the mortgage
insurance on loans originated or purchased by the parent bank or its
affiliates.3 Specifically, the bank subsidiary would assume a portion
of the primary mortgage insurer's obligation in exchange for a por-
tion of the mortgage insurance premium. The OCC determined that
this reinsurance was part of the business of banking because, among
other things, it was a functionally equivalent to, or a logical out-
growth of, the bank's business of underwriting mortgage loans and it
involved risks similar to those associated with permissible mortgage
loan underwriting. In addition, the OCC determined that even if the
reinsurance activity was not considered part of the business of bank-
ing, it could still properly be viewed as incidental to the business of
banking.
C. OCC Advisory Letter 96-8
On October 8, 1996, the OCC issued Advisory Letter 98-6,
"Guidance to National Banks on Insurance and Annuity Sales Activi-
ties," which provides guidance to national banks on various issues
raised by insurance and annuity sales. The Advisory highlights issues
that all national banks should consider when structuring their insur-
ance sales programs in order to ensure that these sales are conducted
in a safe and sound manner and to provide adequate protection to
consumers. The Advisory applies to sales of all types of insurance
and annuities by bank employees, bank subsidiary and affiliate em-
ployees, and sales by third parties operating from bank premises.
The Advisory highlights issues that the OCC believes banks
should consider for both insurance and annuities sales, including
evaluation and selection of products, qualifications and training of
personnel, inappropriate recommendations or sales, employee com-
pensation, complaints and compliance, advertising, customer privacy,
and third party arrangements. The Advisory also includes a review
of the Federal prohibitions on tying, which are applicable to all bank
sales transactions.3
In addition, the Advisory addresses issues that are more par-
ticular to bank insurance sales. These include the sale of insurance
33. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 743 (Oct. 17, 1996) reprinted in [Current Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-108.
34. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972, 12 C.F.R. § 225.7; OCC Bulletin 95-20 (Apr. 14, 1995).
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when a loan application is pending and the setting and circumstances
of bank insurance sales. In both situations, disclosures may be ap-
propriate to ensure the customer is aware of the circumstances under
which the insurance is sold.35 With respect to annuity sales, the Advi-
sory reiterates certain principles from the Interagency Statement on
Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products.36
III. THE BARNETT DECISION
A. Significance of the Barnett Case
National bank sales of insurance products raise unique preemp-
tion issues because of the interplay between the authority delegated
to the states to regulate insurance in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,37
and federally granted powers of national banks to conduct insurance
activities. Barnett is a pivotal case in this area because it provided the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to consider the applicability of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act in light of a federal statute, § 92, that
expressly authorizes national banks to engage in insurance activities.
Specifically, the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "No act
of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
35. For example, when insurance is required as a condition of a loan, to avoid the
impression that a linkage exists between a bank's credit decision and the customer's
choice of insurer, the customer should be informed that he or she need not purchase in-
surance from the bank or any other particular party, that insurance is available from other
than the bank, and that the customer's choice of insurer will not affect the bank's credit
decision or credit terms in any way. With regard to all sales of insurance, during any cus-
tomer contact, banks should disclose that an insurance product is not FDIC insured, is not
a deposit or obligation of the bank, is not guaranteed by the bank, and (if applicable) is
subject to investment risk, unless the bank affirmatively determines, for specific products,
that customers would not reasonably benefit from, or might in fact be confused by, these
disclosures.
36. The Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Non-Deposit Investment Products
(Feb. 15, 1994) contains standards for retail sales and recommendations of nondeposit
"investment products," which include fixed and variable annuities. It addresses a wide
variety of issues relevant to sales of these products, including disclosures and advertising,
setting and circumstances of sales, qualifications and training of personnel authorized to
sell or to provide investment advice, suitability and sales practices, and compensation of
sales personnel and other bank employees. The Interagency Statement is applicable to
bank employees, recommendations and sales by third party employees (affiliated and
nonaffiliated) that occur from or are initiated on bank premises, and sales resulting from
a referral of retail bank customers when the bank receives a benefit from the referral.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
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insurance."3 Thus, McCarran-Ferguson shields a state insurance law
from preemption by a federal law if two conditions are met: (1) the
state law is enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of in-
surance and (2) the federal law at issue does not "specifically relate
to that business." If this special McCarran-Ferguson "anti-
preemption" rule is not available, however, the application of the
state law to a national bank exercising insurance authority pursuant
to § 92 will be determined under a standard preemption analysis.
This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Barnett.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
Barnett involved a Florida law that generally prohibited an oth-
erwise licensed insurance agent who is associated with or owned by a
financial institution from engaging in insurance activities.39 For pur-
poses of these regulations, the term "financial institution" included
any bank, except for a bank which is not a subsidiary or affiliate of a
bank holding company and is located in a city with a population of
less than 5,000.4 Thus, the statute had the effect of prohibiting most
banks from selling insurance in Florida.
The Court analyzed the purpose and language of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act and found that its anti-preemption rule did not apply in
this case because § 92 "specifically relates to the business of insur-
ance."41 Therefore, well-recognized, standard preemption principles
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
39. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 626.988 (1996).
40. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 626.988(1)(a) (1996).
41. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1111. The Barnett holding does not affect two possible ar-
guments that state efforts to regulate certain products may fail under the first prong of
McCarran-Ferguson. One possible argument is that particular bank products, particularly
new products, that are found permissible by the OCC under § 24(Seventh) would fail the
first prong of McCarran-Ferguson because the state effort to regulate a specific bank
product would be the regulation of the business of banking and the corporate powers of
national banks and not regulation of the business of insurance. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank
of Eastern Arkansas v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775, (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972
(1990) (holding that because the debt cancellation contracts offered by FNB fall within
the incidental powers granted by the National Bank Act, they do not constitute the
"business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act). But see American Deposit
Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 185 (1996), in which the
Seventh Circuit held that national bank underwriting of a particular type of fixed annuity,
the so-called "retirement CD," did constitute the business of insurance, even though the
retirement CD was also a permissible bank product. It may also be possible to charac-
terize certain state laws, depending on the language of the state law at issue, as regulating
the conduct of the bank and not the business of insurance. See, e.g., Owensboro National
Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1350 (1996)
(concluding that the state statute "helps to define the powers of Kentucky bank holding
companies by excluding such companies from participation in the activities that constitute
[Vol. 1
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provided the proper framework to analyze the validity of the Florida
statute as applied to national bank insurance sales under § 92.
Initially, the Court noted that where a federal statute does not
reveal an explicit congressional intent to preempt state law, courts
must "consider whether the federal statute's 'structure and purpose,'
or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear, but im-
plicit, pre-emptive intent."'42 A court may discern this preemptive
effect in one of two ways. The federal statute may create a scheme of
federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable that Congress
left no room for the states to supplement it." Alternatively, the fed-
eral law may be in irreconcilable conflict with state law.4
In Barnett, the Court focused on whether the Florida statute and
§ 92 presented an irreconcilable conflict. An irreconcilable conflict
can arise in two ways. Compliance with both laws may be a physical
impossibility.45 The Court rejected this prong because § 92 is permis-
sive, not mandatory, in that § 92 says a national bank "may" sell
insurance rather than "shall" sell insurance. Alternatively, the state
law may "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
The Court concluded that the Florida law was an obstacle to the
accomplishment of § 92's purposes. In reaching its conclusion, the
Court made two points with important ramifications. First, the Court
discussed at length the State of Florida's contention that the federal
purpose of § 92 is to grant the bank only a limited permission, that is,
the permission to sell insurance as agent to the extent that the state
law also grants permission to do so. The Court's textual dissection of
§ 92 reveals that rather than a limited permission, the language of the
statute suggests a broad permission, inferring this in part from the
unqualified language that a bank "may" act as agent for insurance
sales." Second, the Court confirmed the OCC as the sole source of
the 'business of insurance'... . Since we conclude that section 287 was enacted for the
purpose of regulating certain conduct by bank holding companies, not the business of
insurance, we need not consider whether § 92 'specifically relates to the business of insur-
ance' .... ).
42. Barnet4 116 S. Ct. at 1108 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519
(1977) and Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982)).
43. Id. at 1108 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
44. id at 1108 (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654,659 (1982)).
45. Id at 1108 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963)).
46. Id. at 1108 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
47. See Id at 1108. ("[Tlhe Federal Statute's language suggests a broad, not a lim-
ited, permission. That language says, without relevant qualification, that national banks
'may... act as the agent' for insurance sales.").
1997]
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authority regarding the scope of national banks' powers under § 92,
emphatically rejecting the contention that state regulation is im-
ported into § 92 to define the scope of authority granted to national
banks under that section.48
Barnett thus provides clear guidance that state laws that have the
effect of preventing national banks from selling insurance under § 92
do not receive the benefit of McCarran-Ferguson protection and
would be preempted under traditional preemption analysis. In addi-
tion, as discussed below, in dicta, Barnett also highlights the tests that
will determine whether other types of state laws that could affect na-
tional bank insurance activities are preempted under § 92.
IV. AFTER BARNETT
A. Federal Preemption and State Laws That Restrict National Banks'
Section 92 Authority
Following the Court's decision in Barnett, it is clear that the in-
quiry into the permissible bounds of state regulation of national
banks engaged in insurance sales activities under § 92 will shift from
those state laws that prohibit a national bank from engaging in insur-
ance sales to those that restrict the bank's activity in a particular
manner. The laws of different states contain a variety of provisions
that may affect national bank sales of insurance products. Following
Barnett, some states have also moved to adopt new bank-specific laws
and regulations to apply to aspects of banks' insurance sales activi-
ties.49 As one commentator has noted, there is significant uncertainty
in this area and little general judicial guidance.' However, a closer
look at the discussion in Barnett concerning bank powers provides
some important guidance regarding the standard for application of
state law to national bank insurance sales.
48. See id ("It specifically refers to 'rules and regulations' that will govern such sales,
while citing as their source not state law, but the federal Comptroller of the Currency.").
49. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-58-1 to -13; Ky. Stmt. of Emergency, 806 KAR
9:240E (filed Sept. 20, 1996); IIl. Amendment No. 2 to House Bill 2927 (introduced May
13, 1996); Pa. Senate Bill No. 23 (introduced Jan. 15, 1997).
50. Kenneth E. Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal Roles in Bank Regula-
tion, 32 STAN. L. REV. 687, 692 (1980). ("[T]here is inevitably a certain cloud over that
large sector of state regulation that does purport to apply to national banks. It is clear,
given the doctrines of federal instrumentality and federal supremacy, that Congress can
oust state regulation of national banks to whatever extent it sees fit, but it is less clear
when the courts will find the necessary functional impairment or federal preemption in
the absence of any express congressional delegation. Existing decisions provide a few
general clues but limited assurance.").
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In discussing Florida's contention that the federal purpose of
§ 92 is to grant the bank the limited permission to sell insurance to
the extent that the state law also grants permission to do so, the
Court notes the historical connotation of the term "power" in na-
tional bank statutes and cites several cases for the proposition that
grants of enumerated and incidental powers to national banks are
grants of authority "not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily
preempting contrary state law.""1  However, the Court avoids a
sweeping generalization on the status of state laws that conflict with
national bank powers by noting that there may be certain circum-
stances where state law will apply notwithstanding the exercise of a
congressionally authorized national bank power. Specifically, the
Court comments that "[tjo say this is not to deprive States of the
power to regulate national banks, where, (unlike here) doing so does
not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise
of its powers." 2 As examples of this principle, the Court refers to
three cases, which in turn point to others, to illustrate the traditional
preemption principles that will apply. The facts of these cases are
instructive.
At the outset, it is important to note that the Court's observation
that state law may apply in some circumstances is colored by its
strong reliance on a national bank power as ordinarily preempting
state law that intrudes on that power. This view of the preemptive
effect of bank powers on conflicting state regulation helps to place
the Court's subsequent discussion of permissible state regulation in
perspective.
The oldest of the cases cited as examples by the Court, National
Bank v. Commonwealth5 3 considered a state statute that imposed a
tax on each share of bank stock. In that case, the Court attempted to
place this state requirement in context by viewing the tax required by
the state statute as no more of a hindrance than other legal proceed-
ings to which the bank may be subject.' Among other things, the
Court noted that the principles of protecting a bank from state legis-
lation has its limitations:
[I]t certainly cannot be maintained that banks or other cor-
51. Barnett, 116 S. Ct. at 1108.
52. l at 1109 (emphasis added).
53. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1870)
54. The Court stated that the state statute "is no greater interference with the func-
tions of the bank than any other legal proceeding to which its business operations may
subject it, and it in no manner hinders it from performing all the duties of financial agent
of the government." Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
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porations or instrumentalities of the government are to be
wholly withdrawn from the operation of State legislation...
The principle we are discussing has its limitation, a limita-
tion growing out of the necessity on which the principle
itself is founded. That limitation is, that the agencies of the
Federal Government are only exempted from State legisla-
tion, so far as that legislation may interfere with, or impair
their efficiency in performing the functions by which they
are designed to serve that government.5
In Anderson v. Luckett," a Kentucky statute established a com-
prehensive process for administering abandoned deposits that
included, among other things, a report by the bank to the state and
notice to depositors. The appellant, a national bank, contended that
the state statute infringed a national bank's authority to accept de-
posits. According to the Court, the law only allowed the state to step
into the depositor's shoes for purposes of demanding payment on the
deposit account. This result was insufficient to render the law inap-
plicable to national banks. 7 As the Court also notes in the standard
recited in the Barnett decision, the Kentucky state statute did not
create an "unlawful encroachment on the rights and privileges of na-
tional banks."'5 8
McClellan v. Chipman59 involved a conveyance of real estate to
the bank by a customer to secure a debt. At issue was whether Na-
tional Bank Act provisions permitting a national bank to take real
estate for certain purposes preempted a Massachusetts law which in
general forbids a transfer of property within a certain time prior to
insolvency. In concluding that preemption of state law was not avail-
55. Id. at 361-62 (emphasis added).
56. 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
57. See Id. at 248. ("Something more than this is required to render the statute ob-
noxious to the federal banking laws."). An example of something more that could be
required for federal law to preempt state law is found in the Court's discussion in Ander-
son distinguishing that case from its prior decision in First National Bank of San Jose v.
California, 262 U.S. 366 (1923), where the Court found that federal law preempted a Cali-
fornia escheat statute. In Anderson, the Court distinguished the escheat of bank deposits
for "mere dormancy" under the California statute from escheat or appropriation by the
state of property "in fact abandoned" under the Kentucky statute. The Court concluded
that the confiscatory nature of the California law could operate "as an effective deterrent
to depositors' placing their funds in national banks doing business within the state." An-
derson, 321 U.S. at 251. The Court's distinction illustrates the fine lines that can be drawn
based on the particular facts of the case.
58. Id. at 252 (emphasis added). The Court also states that "national banks are sub-
ject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue
burden on the performance of the bank's functions." Id. at 248.
59. 164 U.S. 347,358 (1896).
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able, the Court stated the standard referenced in Barnett that "no
function of such banks is destroyed or hampered" by submitting the
bank to the prescriptions of the state lawf.
The three examples the Court has selected to illustrate the term
"significantly interfere" represent instances in which the federal law
was found not to preempt the state law. It is clear from the facts of
each of these cases that where the Court has found against preempt-
ing state law there was little or minimal qualification of the bank
power per se. In certain of the cases, the state laws appeared to sub-
ject the bank to laws that did not directly or effectively limit the
exercise of those powers, e.g., bankruptcy, tax, or escheat.
Other cases also seem to support this concept. For example, the
Court has indicated that requirements for the bank to provide mini-
mal notices to the state may survive a preemption challenge.6'
However, in Franklin National Bank v. New York,62 the Court found
that a state law prohibiting national banks from using the word
"savings" in its advertising conflicted with the authority of a national
bank to receive savings deposits and to exercise its incidental powers.
A subsequent district court case explaining Franklin noted that the
restriction "inhibited a bank's ability to perform some of its func-
tions" and therefore was preempted.63
McClellan and other cases also reflect another facet of the pre-
emption analysis: whether the state law discriminates against
national banks. In Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, for example, the
Court expressly noted that "[n]othing, of course, in this opinion is
intended to deny the operation of general and undiscriminating state
laws on the contracts of national banks so long as such laws do not
conflict with the letter or the general objects and purposes of con-
60. Id. at 358.
61. See Roth v. Delano, 338 U.S. 226 (1949). The Court focused on the requirement
in Anderson that the bank make a report to the state (a fact that did not command much
attention in Anderson) and noted that there was no interference with the bank's federal
function resulting "from a mere requirement that it make a report to the State of un-
claimed property." I. at 230. The Court further notes that "[ilt would not seem too much
to ask that a federal officer, possessed of property claimed by the State to be subject to its
taxing or escheat power, make reasonable disclosure thereof to such authority as the
State designates." I. However, "[o]f course, these basic and general rights of the State,
including the enforcement of its claims, might be asserted at a time, in a manner or
through such means as to interfere with the federal function of orderly liquidation or to
conflict with federal law." Id Roth, however, is decided on other grounds.
62. 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
63. State of Idaho Department of Finance v. Security Pacific Bank, 800 F. Supp. 922,
926 (D. Idaho) (1992) (emphasis added).
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gressional legislation."' A similar line of reasoning is inherent in
McClellan itself. McClellan states that an exception to the applica-
tion of state law exists when the law "expressly conflict[s] with the
laws of the United States, or frustrates the purpose for which the na-
tional banks were created, or impair[s] their efficiency to discharge
the duties imposed upon them by the law of the United States. '
This standard has been recited in numerous cases involving national
banks.66 And, in Easton v. Iowa,67 the Court noted with respect to na-
tional banking legislation: "That legislation has in view the erection
of a system extending throughout the country, and independent, so
far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if
permitted to be applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions
as various and as numerous as the states." In other words, state stat-
utes that limit or restrict national bank powers effectively
discriminate against national banks because those statutes deny the
national uniformity of powers that is at the heart of the national
banking system.
The fact that the Court uses different formulations in the cases
cited in Barnett, as well as in other cases, sometimes within the con-
fines of the same decision, indicates the difficulty of establishing a
single phrase that captures the preemption standard applicable to
state regulations purporting to cover insurance sales activities under
§ 9 2 .Y8 Banks will have to consider the specific facts and circum-
stances of any particular situation in light of the principles articulated
in and derived from Barnett. Notwithstanding that, it seems clear
from Barnett and the related cases that state law should not apply
where the law significantly qualifies the exercise of a national bank's
powers, either by explicitly treating banks in a disparate manner from
other insurance sellers, or by applying to banks in a manner that has
a disparate impact on them relative to other types of insurance sell-
ers.
64. 161 U.S. 275,290 (1896) (emphasis added).
65. McClellan, 164 U.S. at 350.
66. See, e.g., Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. at 283; First Nat. Bank v. Mis-
souri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924); First National Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366
(1923).
67. 188 U.S. 220,229 (1903).
68. In fact, in a recent decision, the Supreme Court cited two of the cases referred to
in Barnett and referenced several other cases to illustrate the standards used where state
laws were found to apply to national banks. See Atherton v. FDIC, No. 95-928, 1997
USSC LEXIS 461 (Jan. 14, 1997).
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B. Applicability of State Laws
Based on the Court's discussion and cases cited in the Barnett
decision, OCC's Advisory Letter 96-8, discussed above, describes a
basic approach to the application of state laws to national bank insur-
ance activities. According to Advisory Letter 96-8, a state law that
applies generally to regulate insurance agents and agencies will apply
to national banks provided the law does not effectively prevent na-
tional banks from conducting activities authorized under federal law,
and provided that, if the law interferes with the those authorized ac-
tivities, the interference is not significant.
In practice, this should mean that "general and undiscriminat-
ing"69 state laws that regulate insurance agents and agencies generally
would not be preempted because they ordinarily would not prevent
national banks from exercising their federally authorized powers and
the extent to which they might actually interfere with or impair the
ability of a national bank to exercise those powers would be insignifi-
cant. A key point imbedded in this analysis is that state regulation
per se is not an interference with national bank powers; state regula-
tion becomes a problem when it treats or impacts national banks
differently than other insurance agents and that different treatment
significantly interferes with their ability to effectively conduct activi-
ties authorized under federal law.
The Advisory Letter cites examples of types of state laws that
generally would be applicable to national banks. These laws include:
(1)Licensing requirements establishing character, experience,
and educational qualifications for individuals selling insurance as
agent;
(2)Testing and continuing education requirements, and re-
quirements for license renewals, for individuals selling insurance as
agent;
(3)Licensing requirements pertaining to different types of in-
surance that apply to individuals selling particular types of insurance
as agent; and
(4)Market conduct and unfair trade practices standards pro-
hibiting insurance agents from making unfair and deceptive
statements; falsifying financial statements; engaging in defamation,
boycott, coercion and intimidation; unfairly discriminating; improp-
erly rebating; coercing customers; improperly disclosing confidential
69. Davis, 161 U.S. at 290.
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information;' and engaging in claims settlement practices.
On the other hand, it would appear that state laws that target
and/or attempt to specifically restrict how a bank may sell insurance
could be found to impact on a national bank's exercise of its insur-
ance powers.71 The OCC has recently published notice and requested
public comment on whether it should conclude that certain provisions
of Rhode Island state law pertaining to sales of insurance by financial
institutions are preempted by Federal law.72 The provisions raising
preemption issues include provisions that: prohibit a bank from re-
quiring or implying that the purchase of insurance products from a
bank is in any way related to receiving another banking product or
service; restrict where in a bank a bank's licensed agents can solicit or
sell insurance; prohibit certain bank employees from soliciting insur-
ance; require separate applications for loans and insurance; and limit
the ability of a bank to use its customer information to solicit and sell
insurance.'
C. OCC Regulatory Authority
The OCC has not issued regulations to implement the authority
of national banks to sell insurance under § 92, but clearly, it could.
As national banks expand further into insurance sales pursuant to
their § 92 authority, it may become more evident where rulemaking
under § 92 would be desirable. Such regulations could cover a broad
spectrum of issues relating to insurance sales practices or more nar-
rowly focus on specific consumer protection concerns.
An OCC regulation could effect the application of state laws to
national banks. Federal regulations have no less preemptive effect
than federal statutes.74 In responding to opinions addressing the pre-
emptive effect of a regulation, the OCC would apply the judicially
70. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t (1996), would,
however, preempt certain state laws regarding the use of certain information. The FCRA
expressly preempts most state laws in a number of key areas relating to the use and shar-
ing of consumer information and establishes the FCRA as the national standard in these
key areas.
71. State laws that have the effect of preventing banks from sharing in commissions
may raise unique preemption issues. For example, § 92 explicitly provides that a national
bank "may receive for services so rendered such fees or commissions as may be agreed
between the said association and the insurance company...." 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988 and
Supp. V 1993). Moreover, a prohibition on the bank's receiving commissions from the
sale of insurance would impair the exercise of its powers under § 92.
72. See 62 Fed. Reg. 1950 (1997).
73. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-58-6,27-58-8, 27-58-10,27-58-11, and 27-58-12.
74. See Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982).
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recognized preemption standards discussed in this article. In addi-
tion, if the OCC were to promulgate a regulation under § 92, there is
a strong argument to consider another basis for preemption that is
mentioned but not used in Barnett. As the court noted in English v.
General Electric:
[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is
pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Con-
gress intended the Federal Government to occupy
exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a "scheme
of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it," or where an Act of Congress touch[es] a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.'
This basis for federal preemption, often referred to as
"occupation of the field," could become relevant were the OCC to
issue regulations pursuant to its authority under § 92, since, as con-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Barnett, the OCC is the sole
authority for issuing rules and regulations defining the scope of na-
tional banks' powers under § 92.
D. Unresolved Issues Involving Annuities
As noted above, national banks derive their authority to sell an-
nuities from § 24(Seventh), which provides national banks with the
power to exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking."76 In NationsBank of North Caro-
lina N.A. v. Variable Life Insurance Company (VALIC),7 the
Supreme Court upheld the OCC's conclusion that this power includes
the power to sell fixed and variable annuities.
As described at the outset of this article, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act provides that "[n]o act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance."' 8 An unresolved is-
sue is whether the Act shields state laws that purport to prevent or
restrict national banks' sales of annuities from preemption by
75. English v. General Electric, 496 U.S. 72 (1990) (quoting, in part, Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947)).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1994).
77. 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
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§ 24(Seventh)." For example, a state law could explicitly or effec-
tively prevent banks from obtaining the licenses they need to sell
annuities, or a state law could permit banks to sell annuities, but only
from a "place of 5,000." If the McCarran-Ferguson Act's 'anti-
preemption' rule is not available, the application of these types of
state laws to a national bank will be assessed under a standard pre-
emption analysis.
The OCC has advanced several arguments supporting why the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's "anti-preemption" rule does not apply to
state laws that prevent or restrict national bank sales of annuities.'
The first is the threshold issue that annuities simply are not
"insurance" for purposes of the Act. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
already held in SEC v. Variable Life Insurance Company,81 that vari-
able annuities are not insurance for purposes of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.
Although the Court has not specifically ruled on this issue with
regard to fixed annuities, Supreme Court decisions in other contexts,
particularly the Court's reasoning in VALIC,8 as well as numerous
other authorities, support the conclusion that fixed annuities are not
insurance for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.Y For exam-
ple, because neither the statute nor the legislative history of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act define the term "insurance," as a matter of
statutory construction it is appropriate to examine the commonly un-
derstood meaning of that term.4 Both numerous dictionary
definitions of the term and relevant legal encyclopedias support the
79. At least one Federal district court has, however, already ruled, after reviewing
the Barnett and VALIC decisions, that federal law preempted a state law that denied
banks a license to sell annuities to the extent that the state law prevented a national bank
from exercising its power and right to sell annuities as agent under 12 U.S.C.
§ 24(Seventh). See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Ruthardt, 96-12075 PBS (D. Mass. Dec.
19, 1996).
80. See generally OCC Interpretive Letter No. 749 (Sept. 13, 1996) reprinted in
[Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 81-114.
81. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
82. The VALIC Court stated, among other things, that the OCC's classification of
annuities as distinguishable from insurance, based on their tax deferral and investment
features, was reasonable, as was the OCC's classification of fixed and variable annuities
together, based on the fact that they are often packaged together. The Court also noted,
with reference to Black's Law Dictionary, that a key feature of insurance is that it indem-
nifies loss. In addition, the VALIC Court reiterated the Comptroller's observation that
annuities are functionally similar to other investments that banks typically sell and ob-
served itself that fixed annuities have significant investment features and are functionally
similar to debt instruments. VALIC, 115 S. Ct. at 817.
83. See 0CC Interpretive Letter No. 749, supra note 79.
84. See 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.28 (5th ed. 1992).
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conclusion that annuities and insurance are distinct products."
At least one court has, however, ruled that annuities are insur-
ance for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In American
Deposit Corp. and Blackfeet National Bank v. Schacht,' the Seventh
Circuit examined a state law that prohibited a company from trans-
acting insurance business without a state-issued certificate of
authority. In its decision, the Blackfeet court found that a national
bank's issuance of a fixed annuity investment product known as the
Retirement CD was the business of insurance within the meaning of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' It is arguable, however, that the ra-
tionale of the Blackfeet court is inconsistent with other rulings,
including the Supreme Court's VALIC decision, as well as additional
relevant authorities."'
In addition, an argument can be made that even if certain annui-
ties were to be regarded as "insurance" for purposes of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, certain types of state laws flunk the second
prong of the Act's test because they do not "regulate the business of
insurance" and thus are not protected by the anti-preemption rule.
For example, when a state law actually does something other than
regulate the business of insurance, such as where the effect of the law
is to regulate the powers of national banks as a class of entity, is the
state law within the scope of protection provided by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act? The OCC argues that state regulation that negates or
impairs the existing corporate activity of an entire class of entity is
regulation of that type of entity, not regulation of an activity that
constitutes the "business of insurance."
For example, in U.S. Department of Treasury v. Fabe, the Su-
preme Court stated that state laws enacted "for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson
85. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1973); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Compact ed. 1971); 44 C.J.S. In-
surance § 2 (1993); 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance §§ 1, 5 (1982); COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d
(1995) §§ 1:6, 1:22; see generally OCC Interpretive Letter No. 749, supra note 79.
86. 84 F.3d 834 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 185 (1996).
87. Id. at 844.
88. For example, the Blackfeet court based its conclusion that the Retirement CD
was within the business of insurance, in part, on its finding that the Retirement CD in-
volves a mortality risk to the issuer. Id. at 841. The Supreme Court in VALIC, however,
rejected the notion that mortality risk is a determinative indicator that a product is insur-
ance. See VALIC, 115 S. Ct. at 816. The Blackfeet decision also contains a vigorous
dissent stating, among other things, that "[a]nnuities are not truly 'insurance,' and thus ...
a national bank selling them is not engaged in the 'business of insurance'." Blackfeet, 84
F.3d at 865.
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Act are those laws "that possess the 'end, intention, or aim' of ad-
justing, managing, or controlling the business of insurance." 9 The
Court noted in Fabe, "the focus of McCarran-Ferguson is upon the
relationship between the insurance company and its policyholders."'
Thus, state laws that deprive an entire category of entities-national
banks-of the capacity to exercise a corporate power they possess
under Federal law, rather than "transferring or spreading a policy-
holder's risk," or any other practice that is "an integral part of the
policy relationship between an insurer and the insured" would not
constitute the regulation of the business of insurance.9"
Courts of appeals that have examined state insurance laws that
attempt to restrict the authorized activities of national banks have
generally concluded that state law restrictions on the powers of na-
tional banks to conduct those activities do not qualify for the
preemption shield of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. For example, in
Owensboro National Bank v. Stephens,9' the Sixth Circuit examined a
state statute that prohibited national banks from acting as or affiliat-
ing with insurance agents except in very limited circumstances. In
reaching its conclusion that the state statute did not regulate the
business of insurance, and thus was not covered by the anti-
preemption effect of McCarran-Ferguson, the Owensboro court
noted that "[e]xcluding a person from participation in an activity ...
is different from regulating the manner in which that activity is con-
ducted."93 The Owensboro court concluded that because the state
law in question was enacted for the purpose of regulating certain
conduct by certain entities, and not for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, it was not covered by the McCarran-Ferguson
anti-preemption protection.94
89. 508 U.S. 491, 505 (1993) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (6th ed.
1990)).
90. Id. at 501 (referencing SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969)). In
National Securities, the Court found that a state statute aimed at protecting insurance
company stockholders, not policy holders, was not enacted for the purpose of regulating
insurance within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. National Securities, 393
U.S. at 457-65. The National Securities Court observed that "the core of the 'business of
insurance'" is "[t]he relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which
could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement." Id. at 460.
91. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
92. 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1350 (1996).





As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Barnett, national
banks have gained important clarifications of their insurance powers
and a foundation to expand their insurance activities. These activi-
ties, in turn, raise novel questions regarding the applicability of
particular state laws to national banks. Barnett made clear that a
class of laws preventing national banks from engaging in insurance
sales under § 92 are preempted by federal law. At the next level are
those state laws that do not prevent, but do impact or limit in some
way, the ability of national banks to exercise their insurance powers.
The application of particular state laws may have to be handled
on a case-by-case basis, or the laws may be susceptible of being
grouped into generic categories and analyzed by type. In that exer-
cise, however, the Barnett discussion of preemption and other related
cases referred to by Barnett indicate that state laws will be preempted
by § 92 if the law prevents or significantly qualifies a national bank's
powers under § 92, either by explicitly treating banks differently than
other insurance sellers, or by applying to banks in a manner that has
a disparate impact on them relative to other sellers of insurance.
In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in VALIC made clear
that § 24(Seventh) provides authority for national banks to sell all
kinds of annuities. Still at issue in the courts, however, is the extent
to which the McCarran-Ferguson Act's anti-preemption provisions
shield state provisions that prevent or restrict national banks'
authority to sell particular annuity products.
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